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THE SUPPORT STRUCTURE FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LITIGATION IN THE ROBERTS COURT:
A RESEARCH AGENDA
ANN SOUTHWORTH*
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission1 and McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission,2 have sparked enormous public
controversy over the Roberts Court’s stance toward the
regulation of money in politics.3 Supporters of the decisions
laud them for striking down dangerous restrictions on freedom
of speech,4 while critics assert that they have struck a terrible
blow against democratic values and electoral integrity.5 These
* Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine, School of Law. I
am grateful to participants in UC Irvine Law School’s Summer Workshop Series
for advice at the outset of the project described in this essay. Thanks also to Aaron
Benmark, Alexander Danielyan, Yashina Burns, and Thomas Eisweirth for their
research assistance.
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down a prohibition on the use of corporate or
union treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications or express
advocacy not coordinated with a campaign).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (finding unconstitutional federal aggregate limits
on contributions to candidates, political parties, and political action committees).
3. President George W. Bush nominated John Roberts in 2005, initially to
succeed retiring Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. When Chief Justice
William Rehnquist died before Roberts’s confirmation hearings, President Bush
nominated Roberts to become the new Chief Justice.
4. See, e.g., FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT 303–47 (2013) (defending the ruling in Citizens
United); Bradley A. Smith, Free Speech at Last: McCutcheon Decision Just Right,
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/374894/
free-speech-last-mccutcheon-decision-just-right-bradley-smith, archived at http://
perma.cc/GP6E-AMXV (describing McCutcheon as “another step toward
protecting political speech”).
5. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Future of Campaign Finance Laws,
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/court608924-political-campaign.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E5HA-FQZP (“Those
who spend huge sums, after McCutcheon, in contributions to political parties will
be rightly perceived as having undue influence over the government that they
helped to elect.”); Richard L. Hasen, Worse Than Watergate: The New Campaign
Finance Order Puts the Corruption of the 1970s to Shame, SLATE (July 19, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/campaign_
finance_after_citizens_united_is_worse_than_watergate_.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/9DZZ-H3UK (“How does the brave new world of campaign financing
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decisions have attracted a great deal of scholarly
commentary—analyzing the confused history of campaign
finance doctrine, the evolution of the Justices’ views on these
issues, and the reasoning, wisdom, and policy implications of
the rulings.6
My current book project differs from much of the existing
scholarship on the Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions
because it investigates processes that precede adjudication and
focuses on how actors other than judges have helped to create
conditions conducive to constitutional change. The research
traces what might be viewed as the supply-side of adjudication,
or what another scholar, Charles Epp, has called the “support
structure” for legal mobilization.7 This support structure
includes the organizations that have teed up campaign finance
cases for adjudication, the lawyers who have represented the
parties and amici, the scholars and interest groups that have
cultivated and advanced the ideas adopted in the Court’s
decisions, and the financial patrons and advocacy networks
that have supported that process.8
What are the various organizations and who are the
lawyers on both sides of these cases about the expressive rights
of corporations and wealthy donors in electoral politics? What
interests and constituencies do they claim to represent? Which
of these organizations characterize themselves as public
interest groups, and what vision of the public good do they
created by the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision stack up against
Watergate? The short answer is: Things are even worse now than they were
then.”).
6. See, e.g., RONALD COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, WHEN MONEY SPEAKS: THE
MCCUTCHEON DECISION, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(2014); ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM (2014); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 86–88 (2014); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN
AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014);
Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in FIRST AMENDMENT
STORIES 345–73 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012); Richard
L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581
(2011); Michael S. Kang, Party-Based Corruption and McCutcheon v. FEC, 108
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 240 (2014); Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get Into
this Mess? Observations on the Legitimacy of Citizens United, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
203 (2011).
7. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17–20 (1998).
8. For a study of one very important element of this support structure, the
Federalist Society, see AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES,
61–89 (2015).
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purport to advance? What lawyers and other types of resources
do the organizations bring to the effort? What are the lines of
agreement and disagreement among the advocates, advocacy
organizations, and their financial backers, and how united or
fragmented are the parties and amici? Are there obvious
patterns in the types of arguments made and the language and
metaphors, keywords, and turns of phrase used to advance the
arguments? What are these advocates’ ties to one another and
to private law firms, political parties, and bar associations with
particular ideological commitments, such as the Federalist
Society and American Constitution Society?9
Eventually, I plan to study the support structure for a long
line of campaign finance cases from Buckley v. Valeo10 through
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.11 So far, however,
the research focuses primarily on two especially significant
campaign finance decisions of the Roberts Court: Citizens
United,12 which found unconstitutional a provision of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)13 limiting
corporate expenditures in federal elections,14 and McCutcheon,
which invalidated overall limits on the total contributions an
individual can give in an election cycle.15 In Citizens United,
the Court found that corporations, like individuals, have a
First Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts on
elections.16 The decision overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, which upheld a Michigan statute limiting the
amount that corporations could spend to support or oppose
candidates in elections for state offices,17 and McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, which upheld the very provision
of the BCRA invalidated in Citizens United.18 In McCutcheon,
the Court rejected the notion that the government may
9. In her analysis of the influence of the Federalist Society’s “epistemic
community” on campaign finance doctrine, Hollis-Brusky identified many
Federalist Society connections among advocates and scholars. However, she did
not attempt to identify all such ties among the lawyers who participated in the
litigation. See id. at 61–89.
10. 424 U.S. 1, 5–43 (1976).
11. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
12. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13. Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
14. 558 U.S. at 311–16.
15. 134 S. Ct. at 1437–40.
16. 558 U.S. at 314.
17. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
18. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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regulate campaign contributions to prevent the kind of broad
political influence or access that an individual might acquire by
contributing to an unlimited number of candidates and political
committees.19
The research will pursue three broad issues. First, it will
explore the resources and alignments of organizations active in
these cases. With assistance from an excellent team of research
assistants, I have gathered data about the organizations’ tax
statuses, annual revenues, founding dates, board members,
and foundation contributors. I have identified the allies and
adversaries among the litigants, and I am examining how the
organizations’ positions relate to their missions and those of
their financial patrons. The cases are complex, and the briefs
take a variety of different stances, some quite absolute and
others more nuanced. I will analyze the positions of various
constituencies—business and trade groups, libertarians,
liberals, civil libertarians, religious conservatives, unions,
political parties, etc.—and the extent to which they have
agreed and disagreed across and within their respective blocks.
I will consider, for example, whether business groups were
united in opposition to the campaign finance regulations and
whether and to what extent the arguments of ideologically
motivated nonprofit organizations coincided with those of
groups representing the interests of for-profit corporations. I
will review why the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
took the side of the appellant in Citizens United and against
the position of many of their usual liberal allies, and why it
declined to file a brief in McCutcheon. I will also examine
whether the primary financial patrons of the groups on
opposing sides of these cases overlapped or were themselves
divided.
Second, this project will investigate the characteristics of
lawyers active in campaign finance litigation and the structure
of their advocacy network. Using publicly available information
on all lawyers who have filed briefs in these cases, I will
research the advocates’ backgrounds, educational credentials,
employers, political contributions, and ties to bar groups. I will
systematically analyze the characteristics of the lawyers for the
various constituencies represented in this litigation, not only in
the Supreme Court but also in the lower courts. The study will

19.

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460–65 (2014).
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explore the lawyers’ networks, using social network software
and data about the lawyers’ organizational affiliations, drawn
from the lawyers’ biographies and other public sources. I will
also interview some of these lawyers to better understand their
values, purposes, strategies, efforts to coordinate with one
another, and struggles over control of the litigation agenda.
Preliminary analyses of some of the characteristics of the
lawyers who filed briefs in the Supreme Court in Citizens
United and McCutcheon suggest that there are substantial
differences in the educational backgrounds, work locations, and
party allegiances of lawyers for the opposing sides.20 In Citizens
United, more than four-fifths of the lawyers filing briefs in the
Supreme Court on appellee’s (Federal Election Commission’s)
side attended law schools ranked in the top twenty in the U.S.
News and World Report rankings,21 as compared to just half of
lawyers filing briefs on the appellant’s (Citizens United’s)
side.22 Just 2 percent of lawyers for appellee’s side attended
local law schools, defined as schools ranked below fifty, as
compared with one-third of lawyers for appellant’s side. In
McCutcheon, those differences in educational background were
even more pronounced, perhaps because lawyers for the ACLU
and several other civil liberties groups that tend to attract elite
lawyers and were on the appellant’s side in Citizens United did
not participate in McCutcheon.23 There were also notable
20. See Ann Southworth, presentation for panel on “Lawyers, Networks, and
Institutions: Examining the ‘Support Structure’ for Legal Development,” Law &
Society Annual Meeting (May 30, 2015).
21. Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://gradschools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-lawschools/law-rankings?int=992008 (last visited Feb. 8, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/E6A8-8S5L.
22. The data used for these analyses came from Martindale-Hubbell entries
and the websites of the lawyers’ employers. See, e.g., MARTINDALE.COM,
http://www.martindale.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/4ZK9-QBKL.
23. The ACLU’s opposition to campaign finance limitations has been highly
controversial within the organization. See generally Ronald Collins, The ACLU &
the McCutcheon Case, SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:07 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/the-aclu-the-mccutcheon-case, archived at
http://perma.cc/D3H2-GGNF (commenting on the controversy within the ACLU
over campaign finance laws, the filing of briefs by the ACLU and former officials
of the ACLU on different sides of the First Amendment issue in six Supreme
Court cases on campaign finance, and the ACLU’s failure to file a brief in
McCutcheon). On September 4, 2014, six former leaders of the ACLU submitted to
the Senate Judiciary Committee a letter stating that the current leadership of the
national ACLU “has endorsed a deeply contested and incorrect reading of the
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geographic differences. In both cases, a large proportion of the
lawyers on both sides worked in Washington, D.C. However, a
much higher percentage of the lawyers on the appellant’s side
than the appellee’s side worked in the South and Midwest and
a much lower percentage in the Northeast. In both cases,
among those lawyers who made political contributions, the
overwhelming majority on appellant’s side gave exclusively or
primarily to Republicans, while those on appellee’s side
strongly favored Democrats.
These sharp differences are perhaps unsurprising given
that campaign finance has become a highly partisan issue in
recent years and that party affiliation is linked to social
background and geography. Still, it does not necessarily follow
that the lawyers representing the opposing sides should
themselves display those differing characteristics. Interviews
with the advocates may help explain how the lawyers’
backgrounds, values, and political commitments relate to their
professional identities.
Third, I will study the role of organizations and advocates
in promoting some of the controversial ideas adopted in the
Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions but strongly
criticized by the dissenters (and some commentators). In
Citizens United, for example, one of the majority opinion’s
disputed claims is that the corporate identity of the speaker
should be irrelevant in determining the permissibility of the
regulation.24 The majority asserted that regulatory distinctions
among types of speakers—e.g., individuals, nonprofits, forprofit corporations, etc.—constitute a type of pernicious and
impermissible discrimination: “The First Amendment does not
First Amendment as a rigid deregulatory straitjacket that threatens the integrity
of American democracy.” Letter from Former Leaders of the ACLU to Members of
the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, (Sept. 4, 2014), available at
http://www.commoncause.org/policy-and-litigation/letters-to-governmentofficials/National_090414_Civil_Rights_Experts-Letter-Amend.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/DVV6-M32A. The ACLU’s Legislative Director, Laura Murphy,
issued a strong response, reaffirming the ACLU’s opposition to the regulation of
campaign expenditures but its support of public financing for election campaigns.
See Ronald K.L. Collins, Six Former ACLU Leaders Contest Group’s 1st
Amendment Position on Campaign Finance – ACLU’s Legislative Director
Responds,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(Sept.
6,
2014),
available
at
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/09/fan-30-1-first-amendmentnews-six-former-aclu-leaders-contest-groups-1st-amendment-position-oncampaign-finance-aclus-legislative-director-responds.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/KY3V-XHYJ.
24. 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010).
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permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based
on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of
political speech.”25 The dissent took strong issue with the
Court’s critique of identity-based distinctions:
The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its
iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that
the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on
a speaker’s identity, including its “identity” as a
corporation. . . . The conceit that corporations must be
treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere
is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the
Court’s disposition of this case. 26

Another feature of the majority’s opinion that drew criticism is
its characterization of the challenged limitations on corporate
expenditures as “an outright ban on speech.”27 The dissent
again disapproved of the majority’s rhetoric: “Pervading the
Court’s analysis is the ominous image of a ‘categorical ba[n]’ on
corporate speech. Indeed, the majority invokes the specter of a
‘ban’ on nearly every page of its opinion. This characterization
is highly misleading . . . .”28 The dissent also faulted the
majority opinions in Citizens United and McCutcheon for
asserting that the only justification for regulating campaign
expenditures is to avoid quid pro quo corruption29—something
close to outright bribery. The dissent in Citizens United
rejected the “majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo
arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper
influences” and that only the former constitute a sufficient
threat to justify limits on expenditures.30
I will assess what role the advocates have played in
serving up competing frames for the Court and advancing ideas
eventually adopted by the majority.31 One of the qualitative
data management software packages used in this research,
25. Id.
26. Id. at 394.
27. Id. at 312.
28. Id. at 415 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 313.
30. Id. at 448.
31. In subsequent publications, I may explore the litigants’ influence on
dissenters, but I am primarily interested in how litigants contributed to the
arguments that prevailed.
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ATLASti, offers “word crunching” formulas, which count
appearances of a particular word or phrase in a document or
set of documents, while allowing the user to check the context
in which the word or phrase appears. Applying these tools to
the briefs in Citizens United demonstrates that the appellant
and supporters took great pains to advance the argument
against the permissibility of any type of distinction based on
the identity of the speaker; they characterized limits on
corporate expenditures as a form of invidious discrimination.
They also repeatedly described the regulation as a “ban” on
speech or expression. The briefs of appellants and some of their
supporters in Citizens United and McCutcheon portrayed
political influence and access gained through political
expenditures
and
contributions
as
inevitable
and
unproblematic
features
of
representative
democracy.
Systematic parsing of the briefs and sources cited in them—
with help from language-analysis software—may shed light on
how advocates employed key words, concepts, and turns of
phrase (as well as precedents) in their efforts to influence the
Court. Interviews with the advocates may also reveal how and
to what extent the litigants and amici coordinated their efforts
to persuade the Court to adopt these frames.
Overall, this research focuses on how political actors other
than judges have contributed to the processes that have
generated constitutional change in campaign finance doctrine.
The project’s goal is to use both quantitative and qualitative
social science methods to explore the role that advocates,
advocacy organizations, and their patrons and networks have
played in litigating constitutional change in this area,
complementing approaches that focus primarily on judicial
behavior and the policy implications of what judges decide.

